[EALE announce] Business Law and Economics Symposium 15 Feb
来源：未知 作者：admin 人气： 发布时间：2017-03-17
摘要：BUSINESS LAW AND ECONOMICS SYMPOSIUM (BLES) – 15 February 2017“Minority shareholders’ preferences for directors”Wednesday, 15 February -16.00 to 18.00 hrs - room M 10.03(10th floor of the Montesquieu building, Tilburg University) Pleas
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BUSINESS LAW AND ECONOMICS SYMPOSIUM (BLES) – 15 February 2017“Minority shareholders’ preferences for directors”Wednesday, 15 February -16.00 to 18.00 hrs - room M 10.03(10th floor of the Montesquieu building, Tilburg University) Please register for this event by sending an e-mail before Monday, 13 February, to: [email protected]. The Business Law and Economics Symposium (BLES) is organized by an Association of Business Law and Economics Professors from the University of Amsterdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tilburg University. At the kick-off BLES, Christoph Van der Elst will present his paper: Minority shareholders’ preferences for directors in controlled companies. Van der Elst is professor of Business Law and Economics the Law School of Tilburg University (Netherlands). He also is professor of commercial law and corporate governance at the Law School of the Ghent University. His academic papers can be found at:https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=430504 AbstractA balanced composition of the board of directors is considered pivotal for corporate performance. Shareholders have the right to elect this board of directors. However, how shareholders think about their boards remains largely unknown. Director elections disclose valuable information of the shareholders’ views. This study researches which director attributes the shareholders support when voting for board members. The research distinguishes the preferences of non-controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders in the French and Belgian civil law context. The results show that many directors would fail the majority "for" vote of the non-controlling shareholders. Also an executive director receives more votes for than a non-executive director. These findings question a number of corporate governance recommendations, in particular regarding board diversity, which seem not to be widely supported by the shareholders. We argue that a number of best governance principles could better be replaced by a recommendation to disclose the views of both the controlling and non-controlling shareholders vis-à-vis the composition of the board of directors.
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